|
For reasons incomprehensible to the investigation, Pichugin turned down this chance to save his skin. His incarcerators thought he had nothing in common with the fabulously wealthy oligarchs. Indeed, "class hatred" for his employers would be natural. You can picture the persuasive prosecutor: "Who are you covering up for? What d'you owe them?" Perhaps this is just my imagination, but it seems much closer to reality than everything else in the case against him.
One way or another, Pichugin "declined to help with inquiries". We already know the nature of the man, and unlike the investigators have no reason to be surprised. This was the logical outcome of a hastily and poorly prepared KGB tactic. They should have thought in advance who they were arresting.
The truth drug
Time marched onwards and the planned blitzkrieg failed to materialise. No charges were laid against the Yukos chiefs. The arrogant oligarchs were still trampling the country underfoot and were even appearing on TV. The longer and more unpredictable stage of Yukos's destruction, the financial accusations, should have been launched earlier. Those who suggested that starting with Pichugin would quickly have the rest inside had clearly felt their superiors' displeasure. But from where to obtain the accusations?
Why, from Pichugin! It was decided to go for something entirely different. Something that could only occur to FSB officers with long experience of political sensitivities.
The method chosen was as simple as it was illegal, and saved a huge amount of time. It was a special substance known as a truth drug, which forces the recipient to tell all about himself. Even about his own wrongdoings. You just need to ask the right questions.
So, Pichugin would be given the substance, reveal his crimes, and be sent to jail. At the same time he would also spill the beans on Yukos's senior figures. It seems that in the mind of today's FSB officer, a man in Pichugin's position must have done something wrong. And as for someone at Khodorkovskiy's level, well, he was simply bound to be a criminal. Therefore, Pichugin's mind would be a treasure trove of information against himself and the others.
But even if there was little to go on against Khodorkovskiy's associates, he could be offered their freedom in return for falsely accusing any top manager. Nevzlin, for example. As Nevzlin himself has remarked, the FSB's information was that he and Pichugin were so close as to be almost like family. But in fact he didn't even know Aleksey. Wrong information. Again.
The truth drug was used on 14 July 2003. It seems to have been planned for 11 July but postponed because a defence lawyer visited. Of this we can be fairly sure from Pichugin's testimony and his complaint against investigating officer Demidov, which was put on record on 18 July 2003.
So, on 11 July Aleksey was taken from his cell to an unknown office with no nameplate on the door. Two men said they were from the FSB's central staff but declined to identify themselves further. They removed his handcuffs, and told Aleksey they had been instructed by their superiors to get to the bottom of the Gorin affair. And how much they wanted to help him, an FSB veteran. Then the questions began about Gorin and about any dealings with him. Suddenly the phone rang, and from the conversation Pichugin realised that one of his lawyers had turned up. Whereupon the questioning ended, but the FSB men promised to continue on the following Monday, 14 July.
Начало | << | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | 18 | 19 | 20 | 21 | 22 | 23 | 24 | 25 | 26 | 27 | 28 | 29 | 30 | 31 | 32 | 33 | 34 | 35 | 36 | 37 | 38 | 39 | 40 | 41 | 42 | 43 | 44 | 45 | 46 | 47 | 48 | 49 | 50 | 51 | 52 | 53 | 54 | 55 | 56 | 57 | 58 | 59 | 60 | 61 | 62 | 63 | 64 | 65 | 66 | 67 | 68 | 69 | 70 | 71 | 72 | 73 | 74 | 75 | 76 | 77 | 78 | 79 | 80 | 81 | 82 | 83 | 84 | 85 | 86 | 87 | 88 | 89 | 90 | 91 | 92 | 93 | 94 | 95 | 96 | 97 | 98 | 99 | 100 | 101 | 102 | 103 | >>
| 
